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December 2019 
A New Appellate Structure in 
the Supreme Court: Bigger, and 
Better 
by Paul Tan and Lau Kwan Ho 
Singapore will have a new appellate division in the High Court. This is a 
historic development. Its rationale has largely been put on the basis that it 
has become necessary to address the rising number of cases reaching the 
Court of Appeal. In the last five years, the number of matters heard by the 
Court of Appeal has increased by over 56%.1 
The true potential of the reform goes beyond that. Taken together with some 
other equally significant amendments being made to the Supreme Court of 
Judicature Act (SCJA), one likely effect of the measures will, in our view, be 
to increase the volume of appellate work. However, the sophistication at work 
here is that this increased volume will be allocated between two appellate 
bodies, based on the complexity and importance of the cases. This should 
allow a focused use of judicial resources that previously might not have been 
entirely possible. We believe that this will significantly advance the 
development of Singapore law. The restructuring does raise an interesting 
question of stare decisis, which we also discuss below. 
 
The New Structure 
The structure being newly introduced is broadly as follows: 
a. The High Court will comprise two divisions: the General Division and the 
Appellate Division. 
b. The General Division will include the Singapore International Commercial 
Court and the Family Division. It will hear cases that were previously 
allocated to the High Court, including Magistrate’s Appeals from the State 
Courts. 
c. Any appeal from decisions of the General Division will be heard by either the 
Appellate Division or the Court of Appeal, or both, depending on the nature 
of the case. 
d. The jurisdiction of the Appellate Division will include appeals against 
decisions made by the General Division in the exercise of its civil jurisdiction. 
It is, however, envisaged that certain categories of appeals will be specifically 
allocated for direct hearing by the Court of Appeal. The Appellate Division 
will not have criminal jurisdiction. 
e. In turn, the appeals specifically allocated for direct hearing by the Court of 
Appeal include cases in the following categories: 
a. Constitutional or administrative law cases. 
b. Criminal law cases. 
c. Cases relating to the insolvency, restructuring or dissolution of a corporation, 
limited liability partnership or sub-fund of a variable capital company. 
d. Appeals against decisions of the Singapore International Commercial Court. 
e. Cases arising from specified provisions in legislation including: 
 the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016; 
 the Arbitration Act and the International Arbitration Act; 
 the Competition Act; 
 the Maintenance of Parents Act; 
 the Patents Act; 
 the Parliamentary Elections Act; 
 the Personal Data Protection Act 2012; 
 the Presidential Elections Act; and 
 the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019. 
f. The above categories of cases are not closed. The Minister for Law (after 
consulting the Chief Justice) has power to amend the categories. In addition, 
the Court of Appeal may also hear any appeals where so provided by written 
law, thus effectively allowing Parliament to decide which of the two appellate 
courts is to hear disputes arising under specific legislation. Finally, the Court 
of Appeal will have power to transfer a civil appeal ordinarily allocated to itself 
to the Appellate Division, and vice versa. 
g. It appears to be the intention that if an appeal from the General Division 
involves or contains issues, some of which fall within the categories for which 
an appeal should be made directly to the Court of Appeal, and some of which 
do not, then the appeal should be filed to the Court of Appeal.2 Presumably, 
the transfer powers of the Court of Appeal may be exercised here where 
appropriate as well to ensure the proper allocation of resources. 
h. The Court of Appeal may, with leave, also hear appeals against decisions of 
the Appellate Division. Leave may be granted if the appeal raises a point of 
law of public importance. The circumstances in which leave may be granted 
are intended to be narrow, and will include a discretion on the part of the 
Court of Appeal to consider other factors such as whether the decision will 
affect the administration of justice or where there is conflicting 
authority.3 Presumably, leave applications may (as is currently the case) be 
decided either on paper or after a hearing. 
i. Of note is the fact that the Appellate Division may, with leave, hear appeals 
of certain interlocutory matters where currently no appeal would be 
permissible. These matters are those currently specified at paragraphs 1(c) 
to (g) of the existing Fourth Schedule to the SCJA: 
a. An order giving unconditional leave to defend. 
b. An order giving leave to defend on condition of security being put up for the 
sum claimed. 
c. An order setting aside unconditionally a default judgment. 
d. An order setting aside a default judgment on condition of security being put 
up for the sum claimed. 
e. An order refusing to strike out an action, matter, pleading or any part thereof. 
j. Both appellate courts will have power to decide certain categories of cases 
without oral arguments if parties consent. The Appellate Division may also 
sit with two judges (instead of three) if the parties agree and the court 
considers it appropriate to so sit. 
Efficiency and Flexibility 
At one level, these changes to the appellate structure are plainly geared 
towards improving the efficiency of the disposal of appeals. As mentioned, 
one obvious effect of the reform is to split the Court of Appeal’s present 
workload with a new appellate body. 
There are also other procedural innovations to further efficiency and 
flexibility, such as the introduction of hearings on paper or by a two-judge 
court in the Appellate Division. Any concern that a litigant might not have a 
“full hearing” is balanced by (i) allowing the dispensation of oral arguments 
only in certain categories of cases, and (ii) ensuring that the consent of the 
parties and the court is obtained before a two-judge panel is constituted for 
substantive hearings. 
Also generating greater efficiency is that leave applications will be heard by 
the appellate body to which the appeal is being made. It has always been 
slightly awkward to seek leave from the same court that decided the matter 
at first instance. This particular reform is not only procedurally more efficient, 
but entirely sensible. Such leave applications could be dealt with on paper 
as well, further promoting the efficient allocation of judicial resources. 
More Appellate Resources and the 
Development of the Law 
 
Another effect of the reforms is that more judicial resources will be devoted 
to appellate work, potentially leading to more extensive development of the 
content of Singapore law, which has already grown significantly since 
independence.4 This may be seen in a few ways. 
First, and most obviously, the introduction of new Appellate Division judges 
means that there will be two benches of permanent appellate judges. There 
are indications that at least three Judges from the current High Court will be 
appointed as Judges of the Appellate Division.5 Presently, of course, the 
Court of Appeal has been coping with the increase in case load by requesting 
High Court Judges to sit from time to time.6 Such ad hoc enlistments will 
continue to be permitted after the latest amendments, both in the Court of 
Appeal and the Appellate Division,7 but the creation of an additional, 
permanent slate of appellate judges should allow for more judicial time to be 
devoted to appellate work within the Supreme Court. This is perhaps similar 
to how the establishment of a list of permanent Court of Appeal judges in 
1993 may have contributed to increased judicial output.8 We might thus 
expect to see the case law in Singapore grow and develop quicker than 
before. Not only should more cases be disposed of within a given period of 
time, expertise will be gained by the panels of judges on those subjects that 
more routinely come before them. 
Second, there will be more avenues for appeals, potentially generating more 
reasoned appellate judgments. As mentioned, certain interlocutory matters 
may also now be appealed from the General Division to the Appellate 
Division with leave. This seeks to “refine the balance between procedural 
efficiency and also fairness to the parties”.9 
We have already discussed a new category of cases raising points of law of 
public importance, in respect of which there may be as many as three levels 
of hearings. One might even foresee five-judge panels of the Court of Appeal 
to be regularly assembled in cases emanating from a three-judge panel in 
the Appellate Division. That has not happened frequently so far.10 It could 
change if the Court of Appeal continues to customarily retain a permanent 
membership of five judges, making it even more practicable in appropriate 
cases for a five-judge panel to be assembled. Indeed, the combined 
expertise of a greater number of appellate judges being brought to bear on 
complex appeals will be conducive to the development of Singapore law. 
Finally, with the workload shared between two appellate bodies, each will 
have more time and resources to devote to cases raising complex and novel 
legal issues. The categories of appeals that may be filed directly with the 
Court of Appeal were also curated on the basis that some of them would 
raise novel issues of law or “relate to strategic areas that would benefit from 
the stature of the apex court, such as [those seeking] to bolster Singapore’s 
status as a dispute resolution hub or debt restructuring hub”.11 This clearly 
signals a serious intention to develop Singapore law in these key areas. 
 
 
Stare Decisis 
The development of the law is also measured in part by its certainty. In this 
regard, an interesting question arises as to the application of the rules of 
precedent to the Appellate Division as well as the Court of Appeal. 
When the Appellate Division comes into operation, one possible starting 
point could be as follows: 
a. the Court of Appeal strictly binds the Appellate Division (Proposition 1); 
b. the Appellate Division is not strictly bound by its own decisions (Proposition 
2); and 
c. the General Division, if faced with a conflict between Court of Appeal and 
Appellate Division authority, is bound to follow that of the Court of Appeal 
(Proposition 3). 
But for one factor, Proposition 1 appears to be beyond question. The 
possible qualification is that a significant part of the Appellate Division’s 
jurisdiction is explicitly carved out from the Court of Appeal’s existing 
jurisdiction. In certain categories of cases, a matter that would previously 
have been appealed to the Court of Appeal would now proceed to the 
Appellate Division. This is likely to comprise a majority of civil appeals. In 
such cases, should then the Appellate Division be strictly bound by covering 
decisions of the Court of Appeal handed down before the Appellate Division 
came into operation? 
A somewhat analogous situation presented itself in England and Wales 
when the Upper Tribunal was created in 2007 to assume part of the High 
Court’s jurisdiction. Since then it has been held that the Upper Tribunal is not 
bound by older decisions of the High Court when exercising the transferred 
jurisdiction.12 That may not be illuminative of the position in Singapore. The 
respective legislation creating the Appellate Division and the Upper Tribunal 
is unmistakably different; another obvious difference is that appeals from the 
Upper Tribunal typically proceed to the Court of Appeal (and not the High 
Court) in England and Wales, whereas in Singapore a matter in the Appellate 
Division would proceed, if at all, only to the Court of Appeal. From the 
viewpoint of consistency of application of the law, it would be desirable for 
the Appellate Division to strictly follow all covering decisions of the Court of 
Appeal, whether those decisions were handed down before or after the 
Appellate Division came into operation.13 Having more rigidity here may also 
assist in avoiding difficult and recurrent struggles with the issue, especially 
since the types of cases falling respectively within the jurisdiction of the Court 
of Appeal and of the Appellate Division may be subject to alteration from time 
to time. 
Proposition 2, which says that the Appellate Division is not strictly bound to 
follow its own decisions, is certainly one plausible way to extend the existing 
rules governing the treatment of co-ordinate authorities. However, the unique 
position of that court could give rise to an exception. This may be informed 
by the practice in civil cases of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, 
which sits as an intermediate appellate court between the High Court and 
the UK Supreme Court. 
In civil cases, decisions made by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales 
are binding on itself save in exceptional cases. The best known of the 
exceptions are those contained in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd:14 (i) the 
court is bound to decide which of two conflicting decisions of its own it will 
follow; (ii) the court is bound to refuse to follow a decision of its own which, 
although not expressly overruled, cannot in its opinion stand with a decision 
of the House of Lords or the Supreme Court; and (iii) the court is not bound 
to follow a decision of its own if it is satisfied that the decision was given per 
incuriam. 
However, as Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning tried to loosen those fetters, 
urging on multiple occasions that it was necessary in the interests of justice 
for the Court of Appeal not to have to follow a previous decision of its 
own.15 Those attempts were rebuffed, with Lord Diplock stating in Davis v 
Johnson that:16 
“In an appellate court of last resort a balance must be struck between the 
need on the one side for the legal certainty resulting from the binding effect 
of previous decisions, and, on the other side the avoidance of undue 
restriction on the proper development of the law. In the case of an 
intermediate appellate court, however, the second desideratum can be 
taken care of by appeal to a superior appellate court, if reasonable 
means of access to it are available; while the risk to the first 
desideratum, legal certainty, if the court is not bound by its own 
previous decisions grows ever greater with increasing membership…” 
Lord Diplock further elaborated by quoting Scarman LJ’s earlier words 
in Tiverton Estates Ltd v Wearwell Ltd:17 there would be a risk of doubt and 
confusion arising (where there should be certainty and consistency) if one 
division of the court refused to follow another because it believed the other’s 
decision to be wrong, in circumstances other than those falling within the 
exceptions stated in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd. The appropriate 
forum for the correction of the Court of Appeal’s errors was the House of 
Lords; an intermediate appellate court needed no power of review over its 
own decisions. 
In the light of these considerations, particularly the goal of realising the 
advantages of legal certainty and consistency, one might conclude that the 
Appellate Division should generally be bound to follow its own decisions, 
save in limited exceptions similar perhaps to some of those operating in 
respect of the Court of Appeal in England and Wales, Civil Division. This 
seems all the more so because, in Singapore, there remains an avenue to 
obtain leave for further appeal to the Court of Appeal, in cases where the 
apex court’s intervention is needed to resolve a point of law of public 
importance, or where the interests of the administration of justice so require. 
Proposition 3 – that the General Division, if faced with a conflict between 
Court of Appeal and Appellate Division authority, must follow that of the Court 
of Appeal – again seems unremarkable, subject to one possible qualification. 
In certain categories of cases, the appeal must, by default, proceed from the 
General Division to the Appellate Division, not the Court of Appeal. An 
argument might be made that, in such cases, it is the Appellate Division’s 
word that counts. However, that contention becomes unattractive once it is 
realised that the default route of appeal is not an absolute one (because 
there exist avenues for appeals to be transferred between the Appellate 
Division and the Court of Appeal), and particularly also if, as has been 
suggested above, the Appellate Division itself is strictly bound to follow all 
covering decisions of the Court of Appeal, regardless of when they were 
handed down. 
In summary, it is respectfully suggested that the following approach to the 
operation of stare decisis commends itself, balancing as it does the 
requirements of fairness, justice and certainty, in conjunction with the 
development of the law: 
a. the Appellate Division is bound to follow all covering decisions of the Court 
of Appeal, whether those decisions were handed down before or after the 
Appellate Division came into operation; 
b. the Appellate Division is bound to follow its own decisions, unless one of the 
established exceptions (similar to those relevantly operating in respect of the 
Court of Appeal of England and Wales, Civil Division) applies; and 
c. the General Division, if faced with a conflict between Court of Appeal and 
Appellate Division authority, is bound to follow that of the Court of Appeal. 
 
Conclusion 
The recent reforms to the appellate structure will achieve much more than 
assist in easing the workload of the Court of Appeal. Its likely effect is also 
to enlarge the volume of potential appeals, in combination with an expansion 
of the number of judges who will perform an appellate adjudicatory function 
on a permanent basis. Over time, this should lead to a more focused and 
efficient allocation of judicial resources commensurate with the complexity 
and importance of cases brought before the courts. Inasmuch as more 
judicial resources are being dedicated to the disposal of appeals, the reforms 
may also create the need for specialism in appellate work at the Bar. This is 
particularly so in matters before the Court of Appeal in terms of being able to 
present the client’s case as one deserving of leave, and to assist that court 
in coming to decisions on complex and important matters. Our prediction is 
that the reforms will, collectively, enhance the development of Singapore 
law, and are therefore to be welcomed. 
The authors are grateful for the views of Professor of Law Goh Yihan, 
Dean, Singapore Management University 
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